



CRIME AND CULTURE
Project Workshop, University of Konstanz,
2-3 February 2007

**SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, PRIORITY 7, FP6-2004-CITIZENS-5**




**SPECIFIC TARGETED RESEARCH PROJECT:
CRIME AND CULTURE**

Crime as a Cultural Problem.

**The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention.
A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria
and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and in
the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom**

**Project Workshop, University of Konstanz,
2 – 3 February 2007**

Summary of Proceedings



University of Konstanz
Department of History and Sociology
Research Group Sociology of Knowledge



Participants List

CENTRE FOR LIBERAL STRATEGIES, BULGARIA

Dr Daniel Smilov

Tel. ++ 359 2 986 14 33; + 359 2 981 89 26

Fax: ++ 359 2 981 89 25

Daniel@cls-sofia.org

Rashko Dorosiev (M.A.)

Tel. ++ 359 2 986 14 33; ++ 359 2 981 89 26

Fax: ++ 359 2 981 89 25

rashko@cls-sofia.org

Ms. Anna Ganeva (M. A.)

RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE QUALITY OF LIFE – ROMANIAN ACADEMY, ROMANIA

Professor Dr Ioan Marginean

Tel/Fax.: ++401 411 48 06

imargin@iccv.ro

Dr Iuliana Precupetu

Tel: ++40 723 208 373

iuliana@iccv.ro

Ms Cosmina Chitu (M A.)

Tel: ++49 726 008 139

cosmina@iccv.ro

Ms. Adriana Baboi (M. A.)

GALATASARAY UNIVERSITY, TURKEY

Professor Dr. Ahmet Insel

Tel: 0090-212-2274480

ainsel@gsu.edu.tr

Ms Zeynep Sarlak (M. A.)

Tel: ++90 212 2274480

zsarlak@superonline.com

Ms Esra Kuyas (M.A.)



CRIME AND CULTURE
Project Workshop, University of Konstanz,
2-3 February 2007

Dr Besim Bülent Bali

UNIVERSITY OF ZAGREB, CROATIA

Professor Dr. Aleksandar Stulhofer

Tel: 00385 612-0170

Fax: 00385 615-6879

astulhof@ffzg.hr

Professor Dr Ognjen Caldarovic

Tel: ++385 98350 811,

++385 1 612 0007

++385 1 617 1972

ognjen.caldarovic@ffzg.hr

Professor Dr Kresimir Kufrin

Tel: ++385 1 612 0042

kkufrin@ffzg.hr

Ms Margareta Gregurovic (B.A.)

CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY MAKING, MACEDONIA

Dr Zidas Daskalovski

Mobile: +38970231 949

daskalovski@hotmail.com

**NATIONAL CENTRE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, GREECE**

Mr Nikos Papamanolis (M.A.)

Tel: ++30 210 924 14 448

Fax ++30 210 8670 014

nikos_papamanolis@yahoo.co.uk

Ms Eleftheria Bakali (M.A.)



CRIME AND CULTURE
Project Workshop, University of Konstanz,
2-3 February 2007

**PANTEION UNIVERSITY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE,
GREECE**

Professor Dr Effi Lambropoulou

Tel ++30 210 920 1804

Fax ++30 210 8670 014

elambro@panteion.gr

Ms Stella Angeli (M.A.)

Tel: ++30 210 86 12 763

Fax ++30 210 8670 014

stellaageli@yahoo.gr

**SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES AT OXFORD (SEESOX), UNITED
KINGDOM**

Dr Sappho Xenakis

S_xenakis@hotmail.com

Mr Kalin Ivanov (M.A.)

kalin.ivanov@politics.ox.ac.uk

UNIVERSITAET KONSTANZ, GERMANY

Professor Dr. Hans-Georg Soeffner

Tel: 0049 7531 882344

Fax: 0049-7531-883194

Hans-georg.soeffner@uni-konstanz.de

Dr Dirk Tänzler

Tel: ++49 7531 882344

Fax: ++49-7531-883194

Dirk.taenzler@uni-konstanz.de

Dr Angelos Giannakopoulos

Tel: ++49 7531 883129

Fax: ++49-7531-883194

Angelos.giannakopoulos@uni-konstanz.de

EBERHARD-KARLS-UNIVERSITAET TUEBINGEN, GERMANY

Dr Dr Konstadinos Maras

Tel: ++49 931 3534801

Konstadinos.maras@uni-tuebingen.de



CRIME AND CULTURE
Project Workshop, University of Konstanz,
2-3 February 2007

**POLICE UNIVERSITY, GERMAN FEDERAL STATE OF BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG**

Professor Dr. Joachim Kersten

Fachhochschule Villingen-Schwenningen, Hochschule für Polizei
Sturmbühlstraße 250
78054 Villingen-Schwenningen
Tel: ++49 7720 309-0
JoachimKersten@fhpol-vs.de

The Bulgarian Case

The Bulgarian team interviewed the Executive Director of Transparency International Bulgaria. TI objected to the term 'phenomenon' because they emphasised it is widespread, everyday practice. This also raised the problem of measuring corruption; their preference for a legalistic definition but did not measure it by the legal processes' success (but rather by the business community's perceptions). Inconsistencies in TI's approach to corruption were highlighted by the Bulgarian team. It was also pointed out that TI does not advocate political change along democratic, participatory ways, but rather pursue legalistic/investigative/criminal prosecution avenues for change, and co-operation between NGOs with the political actors to change the mindset and ethos of the agents. In a way, this reintroduces something that they are trying to avoid; more culturally-dependent notions of what corruption involves.

The German Case

The central thesis of the German team is to pin down what in the institutional framework is considered to be sufficient evidence, and secondly, to understand what was necessary to achieve it. Dirk pointed out that most cases are pushed on by the prosecutor because of lack of evidence. Hans-Georg underlined that the police do not know exactly what they are looking for but are encouraged to have general suspicion that crime could be anywhere.

The logic of the interviewee was structured thus: corruption goes beyond what the penal law sanctions. If this is so, the investigations must step back and take their bearings from the environment. From this will be generated initial suspicions (emphasised by the police interviewee); this demands passion, tenacity and above all, skills to reconstruct the case based upon practical knowledge (i.e. giving a persuasive account of the eventual case to the general prosecutor). When this comes together, anti-corruption efforts can be made more effective.

Conspicuous signs of something corrupt help to fill out, or give life, to the case, which helps the police to present a stronger case to the prosecutor. This definition is too broad – in contrast, evidence for bribery is very simple; police are trying to make



CRIME AND CULTURE
Project Workshop, University of Konstanz,
2-3 February 2007

people aware of what is happening in society, to provide a context, in a similar way to what TI are trying to achieve! Coalitions between police and attorneys against judges is common.

The Romanian Case

There were some problems making interviews with the police, even though we have a formal protocol of co-operation with the Ministry of the Interior they are frightened of what a police officer might say in interview. The NGO representative interviewed referred to the communist legacy and pattern of stealing from the state as an explanation of the roots of corruption practices in Romania. In particular, he suggested that people's immorality in this respect is restricted to their relations with the state, not with each other (i.e. not between friends and family). Networks of former Securitate officials strongly influence the judiciary. Anti-corruption efforts went beyond formalism and were increasingly flexible and focusing on changing political culture. At the request of the EU, the national integrity agency was established to verify the declarations and wealth declared by politicians, but parliament has postponed its establishment and are discussing ways to divert the efforts from this problem.

The role of the EU is seen as very significant and without it they would not have been able to achieve that much, e.g. the reform of the law on party-funding. There is a compatibility between EU and national objectives. But he argued that national anti-corruption strategy is not working because no high-level politician is involved, so people don't take it seriously. He was the director of an association with a background in political science, only 29 years old. The NGO is very influential and very active, more so than TI in Romania.

The Turkish Case

The interview presented was with a prosecutor, an expert on money-laundering. His definitions of corruption were a perfect match with the judicial approach. For him, corruption was what it said in the penal code. Then he said that for society and for judicial experts there is a difference; for the public, it is just about bribery, but for him, though bribery is very hard to pinpoint, we punish it because it represents disloyalty and demonstrates disrespect to the administration. Simple bribery is mutual and to carry out usual duties, whereas qualified bribery is where the officer is expected to do something contrary to their duties. Bribery is the taking of the bribe by an official, not the giving of a bribe. He believed that the cleanest institution in Turkey was the judiciary (though he distinguishes between judiciary as judges and attorneys, and the judiciary as lawyers and the bureaucracy of the judiciary).

One obstacle to anti-corruption efforts he cited is the principle of "presumption of innocence" in the Constitution because evidence is hard to gather. He also complained about the double standards of the EU in its relations with regard to Turkey and corruption. The public procurement law's ratification was the only successful outcome of EU pressure, but has since been modified. Party-financing was a big problem (repayment of election costs by granting favours, 'blood money'). He also



CRIME AND CULTURE
Project Workshop, University of Konstanz,
2-3 February 2007

said that anti-corruption measures should be expanded to the private sector. The media is corrupt too. For him, capitalism in general was the reason for corruption. There is a tacit agreement between developed countries - e.g. tax havens, offshore countries. He was very critical of NGOs too – especially of the Open Society Institute. He argued that the losers are ordinary citizens and development. The winners are habitants of gated communities. To conclude, the interviewee was analysed: his subjective assessment of the judicial system was highlighted, his conflicting identities as attorney, prosecutor and as ordinary citizen. A list of areas for future questions were then outlined.

The Croatian Case

The definition of corruption provided by a high-ranking local government official was very broad, but the whole interview was an exposition of their understanding of corruption and their interpretation of the meaning began to shrink accordingly. The main cause of corruption in state services is due to underpaid officials, the official suggested. In addition, general insecurity and mismanagement of financial assets is evident; much money is being used unproductively. Other causes of corruption cited were cultural attitudes and fundamental social problems. It was considered normal that return of favour is always asked for, political donors are always seeking something in return.

The media is seen as corrupt and not credible and does not employ a systematic approach to corruption. Local government has more control over deployment of financial resources than available to those wielding power nationally, but they had no specific strategy to combat corruption at the local level. The EU is seen as exerting excessive pressure on Croatia and being hypocritical in its demands (requiring things which it has not achieved itself). A very sceptical and suspicious view of NGOs was expressed too, so they could not help in fighting corruption, apart from Transparency International.

The Greek Case

The first interview was with a representative of the press, a journalist with a very open attitude. His definition of corruption was ‘a kind of exchange’ which often involves bribery but doesn’t always involve breaking the law. He argued that corruption was always evident in Greece but has taken a new form (clientalism, in the past, and that related to private sector growth, in the current period). He stressed that oversight mechanisms within parliament were insufficient to combat corruption; political will was key. He argued that without corruption public administration could not function (to accelerate procedures), and was not always illegal and was sometimes accepted as legitimate by people. Public administration is strongly manipulated by political power and is overly bureaucratic; this fuels corruption. What is needed is reform of Greek public administration; modernisation, use of information technologies, simplification of procedures – the Lisbon strategy, in other words. Staff is the key and they should be evaluated through objectives achievement. Public administration corruption was a matter of political culture; the state does not care for its citizens and Greeks do not



CRIME AND CULTURE
Project Workshop, University of Konstanz,
2-3 February 2007

trust it, so corruption mediates or balances this difference. The media was viewed critically for scandalising rather than analysing corruption. Whilst journalists are restricted from engaging in corruption, there are very few and powerful media moguls in Greece.

The second interview was of a recent former member of Transparency Hellas. It was an open discussion rather than a structured interview, and focused on the electoral system, candidate financing, national and EU anti-corruption legislation, public administration and the awarding of public works contracts. He repeatedly compared Greece with other EU countries. For him, corruption was a matter of culture (undefined), related to the level of trust between citizens and the state, complex bureaucracy and legislation. Corruption was seen as the power one uses for ones own favour and against the organisation they represent. TI Greece was restricted by a lack of money to only holding a few conferences each year. There were some inconsistencies in his argument regarding the impact of the size of the small market of Greece on corruption. His perspective was very much one of an economist rather than as an NGO representative. He was quite pessimistic, that corruption is an essential characteristic of the Greek context.

The UK Case

A director of TI was interviewed and results presented at the meeting. The interviewee demonstrated a difficulty in distinguishing normative values from objective interpretation of the success of anti-corruption efforts in the UK (especially with regard to the value and impact on law development and on impact of training and education for companies). A considerable and perhaps surprising degree of pragmatism was demonstrated in accepting logic sympathetic to cases of non-compliance by state and businesses. There was optimism based on legal developments, raising the profile and discourse of the subject in the UK. The language used by the interviewee still suggested that corruption in the UK was not to be overplayed or exaggerated (referred with soft criticism to the view that the UK did not have corruption problems, but was uncomfortable with the challenge that TI itself had under-focused on corruption in the UK; blamed it on lack of resources in early days and desire to help the poor in developing countries.) The general public were not considered important to the discourse. Faith in basic decency of elite morality and corruption by mistake or mistaken logic was evident. There was a surprising level of support for business and portrayal as flexible partners in fighting corruption, more flexible and ahead than politicians. The media were seen as much as negative than as a positive, but a more rigorous interpretation or critique of their role and influence was lacking (i.e. FT and Economist – more influence with those with access and opportunity to corrupt than Guardian readers?).